Supreme Court, U. S.
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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1976

No. 76-423

PUYALLUP TRIBE, INC.,
and
RAMONA BENNETT,

Petitioners,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF GAME OF
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent.

APPENDICES C, D, E
TO PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI

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APPENDIX C

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE STATE OF

WASHINGTON IN AND FOR

PIERCE COUNTY

DEPARTMENT OF GAME OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,	)	
Plaintiff,	)	No. 158069
vs.	)	MEMORANDUM DECISION
PUYALLUP TRIBE, INC.,	)	
Defendant.	)	

This case has been remanded to this court by the United States Supreme Court in order to have it determine the allocation between the Treaty Indians and others of the steelhead run in the Puyallup River. Department of Game of the State of Washington vs. The Puyallup Tribe, et al., 414 U.S. 44, 38 L.ed. 2d 254, 94 S. Ct. 330 (referred to hereafter as Puyallup I).

That allocation is to be accomplished by fairly apportioning that run on this river between these parties.

The U. S. Supreme Court in that decision interpreted the Medicine Creek Treaty on page 5 as follows:

> "The aim is to accommodate the rights of Indians under the Treaty and the rights of other people.
>
> "We do not imply that these fishing rights persist down to the very last steelhead in the river. Rights can be controlled by the need to conserve a species; and the time may come when the life of a steelhead is so precarious in a particular stream that all fishing should be banned until the specie [sic] regains assurance of survival. The police power of the state is adequate to prevent the steelhead from following the fate of the passenger

> pigeon; and the Treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets."

That court thus reaffirmed its prior holding that the police power of the state is adequate to prevent extinction of the specie and that there is no Treaty right that gives these Indians a federal right to pursue that last living steelhead.

That decision of the majority appears to be clarified by a concurring opinion to the extent that the Treaty rights of these Indians extend only to the natural run of the steelhead and that Treaty Indian fishery cannot take so many steelhead that the natural run would suffer progressive depletion.

This opinion refers to off-reservation rights of these Treaty Indians. In a prior opinion, The Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game of Washington, 391 U. S. 391, 20 L.ed. 689, 88 S. Ct. 1725, (Referred to hereafter as Puyallup II), the court did not reach the question as to whether or not this Puyallup Indian Reservation still existed. See footnote on

page 691.

The trial court found it did not. Further comment on that issue will be made at a later point in this opinion. On the two prior occasions this case has been before the U. S. Supreme Court an interpretation of the Medicine Creek Treaty has been made by that court.

The construction of that Treaty in the case of Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of the State of Washington, supra, (May, 1968, Puyallup I) was as follows:

> 1. The "right" to fish outside of the reservation cannot be qualified by the State of Washington.
>
> 2. The Treaty "right" was to fish "at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations."
>
> 3. The Treaty "right" is not an exclusive one. It is one "in common with all citizens of the Territory."

4. The Treaty did not specify the manner in which the fishing may be done. This silence indicated that the State of Washington can regulate the manner of fishing, the size of the take, the size of the commercial take, and the like, for conservation purposes, providing the regulations meet appropriate standards and do not discriminate against these Indians.

5. The overriding police power of the State, expressed in non-discriminatory measures for conserving fish resources is preserved.

In the second case the U. S. Supreme Court further construed this Treaty. It held again in that case (Dept. of Game v. Puyallup Tribe, Inc., supra, (Puyallup II):

1. That the Treaty gave to these Indians the right to fish for steelhead commercially and with nets.

2. That the police power of the State has the authority to regulate the manner of fishing, the size of take, the restriction of commercial fishing, and the like, so long as the regulation is in the interest of conservation and the regulations do not discriminate against the Indians.

3. That the aim of the court was to accommodate the rights of the Indians under the Treaty and the rights of other people.

4. The Treaty rights of the Indians can be controlled by the need of preserve a species.

5. The police power of the State is adequate to prevent the steelhead from following the fate of the passenger pigeons.

> 6. The Treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to pursue the last living steelhead until it enters their nets.

In that opinion three judges concurred. They further observed that this opinion meant:

> 1. That the Treaty did not obligate the state to subsidize the Indian fishery with planted fish paid for by sports fishermen.
>
> 2. The Treaty rights extend only to the natural run of steelhead.
>
> 3. The Treaty Indian fishery cannot take so many fish that the natural run would suffer progressive depletion.
>
> 4. That commercial fishing by these Indians cannot be totally forbidden in order to permit sports fishing in the usual volume.

> However, commercial fishing may be restricted in the interests of conservation.

Both opinions agree that the issue for resolution is the problem of accommodating commercial fishing by the Puyallups with conservation needs of the river and the rights of other people.

The word "conservation" was not defined in either of these decisions. That definition appears to be of paramount importance. In the original case that term was defined as follows, and I quote from the definition of J. E. Lasater, Associate Director of Operations, Department of Fisheries:

> "A. Very simply, it is wise use. When we put it in terms of salmon harvest, I would put it in three categories or three parts, by harvest, in management of salmon as a crop, <u>one</u>, there must be a surplus and over and above the needed spawning escapement to have an available crop and not be taking the feed stock. <u>Two</u>, the manner of

> fishing, itself, must be such that you can control it so that you do not dip into the seed stock. . . . The other thing is that the manner of fishing, itself, must not be destructive."

That definition was agreed to by all parties in this present trial.

Mr. Heckman, an expert witness for the defendant agreed to this definition but added only that there must be a maintenance of the habitat of the specie [sic].

I mention this aspect because it does bear on the extent of the regulatory authority of the state.

It is one thing to regulate for conservation with the purpose of preventing extinction of a specie, and quite another thing to regulate for the overall conservation program of the State of Washington. That program is designed to preserve and increase the production of salmon and steelhead for all user groups in all waters of the State of Washington. It is my opinion that all parties agree this is the program of the State of Washington in regard to all anadromous fish.

Accordingly I adopt that definition of the word "conservation" and interpret these two United States Supreme Court decisions to hold that the State of Washington has authority, for these conservation purposes, to regulate all persons in the manner in which they take fish and the amount of that take. These regulations must equally affect Treaty Indians when they fish off their reservation and must not discriminate against Indian fishery. Conservation in this regard is as helpful to the Treaty Indians as it is to all others. The fish are conserved, extinction is prevented and production increased and assured.

In order to apportion the steelhead in this circumstance it is necessary to again refer to the Treaty of Medicine Creek itself to determine and define a certain phrase.

The Treaty contains language in Art. 4, §3, as follows:

> "The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations in further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory,

and of erecting temporary houses for the curing, together with the privilege of hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing horses on open and unclaimed lands:

> "Provided, however, that they shall not take shell fish from any beds staked or cultivated by citizens, and they shall alter all stallions not intended for breeding horses, and shall keep up and confine the later [sic]."

The phrase "in common with all citizens of the Territory" has not been specifically judicially defined.

There have been various judicial reference to that phrase, however. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U. S. 556, 60 L.ed. 1167, decided in 1916, involved the interpretation of the Seneca Indian Treaty of 1797. It reserved to the Indians the privilege of fishing and hunting on lands located in the State of New York.

The question involved the prosecution of three Seneca Indians for spearing fish off the Seneca Reservation in violation of the statutes of the State of New York.

The pertinent language of that opinion is set out as follows:

> "The right thus reserved was not an exclusive right. Those to whom the lands were ceded, and their grantees, and all persons to whom the privilege might be given, would be entitled to hunt and fish upon these lands, as well as the Indians of this tribe. And, with respect to this non-exclusive right of the latter, it is important to observe the exact nature of the controversy. It is not disputed that these Indians reserved the stated privilege both as against their grantees and all who might become owners of

the ceded lands. We assumed that they retained an easement, or profit a prendre, to the extent defined; that is not questioned. The right asserted in this case is against the state of New York. It is a right sought to be maintained in derogation of the sovereignty of the state. It is not a claim for the vindication of a right of private property against any injurious discrimination, for the regulations of the state apply to all persons equally. It is the denial with respect to these Indians, and the exercise of the privilege reserved, of all state power of control or reasonable regulation as to lands and waters otherwise admittedly within the jurisdiction of the state.

"It is not to be doubted that the power to preserve fish and game within its borders is inherent in the

sovereignty of the state (Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 40 L.ed. 793, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 600; Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 507, 41 L.ed. 244, 245, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1076), subject, of course, to any valid exercise of authority under the provisions of the Federal Constitution. It is not denied -- save as to the members of this tribe -- that this inherent power extended over the locus in quo and to all persons attempting there to hunt or fish, whether they are owners of the lands or others. The contention for the plaintiffs in error must, and does, [563] go to the extent of insisting that the effect of the reservation was to maintain in the tribe sovereignty quoad hoc. As the plaintiffs in error put it: 'The land itself became thereby subject to a joint property ownership

and the dual sovereignty of the two peoples, white and red, to fit the case intended, however, infrequent such situation was to be.' We are unable to take this view. It is said that the state would regulate the whites and that the Indian tribe would regulate its members, but if neither could exercise authority with respect to the other at the locus in quo, either would be free to destroy the subject of the power. Such a duality of sovereignty, instead of maintaining in each the essential power of preservation, would in fact deny it to both.

"It has frequently been said that treaties with the Indians should be construed in the sense in which the Indians understood them. But it is idle to suppose that there was any actual anticipation at the time the treaty was made of the conditions now

existing, to which the legislation in question was addressed. Adopted when game was plentiful, -- when the cultivation contemplated by the whites was not expected to interfere with its abundance, -- it can hardly be supposed that the thought of the Indians was concerned with the necessary exercise of inherent power under modern conditions for the preservation of wild life. But the existence of the sovereignty of the state was well understood, and this conception involved all that was necessarily implied in that sovereignty, whether fully appreciated or not. We do not think that it is a proper construction of the reservation in the conveyance to regard it as an attempt either to reserve sovereign prerogative, or so to divide the inherent power of preser-

vation as to make its competent exercise impossible. Rather are we of the opinion that the clause is fully satisfied by considering it a reservation of a privilege of fishing and hunting upon the granted lands in common with [564] grantees, and others to whom the privilege might be extended, but subject, nevertheless, to that necessary power of appropriate regulation, as to all those privileged, which inhered in the sovereignty of the state over the lands where the privilege was exercised. This was clearly recognized in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 384, 49 L.ed. 1089, 1093, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 662, where the court, in sustaining the fishing rights of the Indians on the Columbia River, under the provisions of the treaty be-

tween the United States and the Yakima Indians, ratified in 1859 [12 Stat. at L. 951], said (referring to the authority of the state of Washington): 'Nor does it' (that is, the right of "'taking fish at all usual and accustomed places'") 'restrain the state unreasonably, if at all, in the regulation of the right. It only fixes in the land such easements as enable the right to be exercised.'"

This case held specifically that this clause was a reservation of a privilege of fishing and hunting on off-reservation lands in common with all others subject to the necessary power of appropriate regulation as to all those privileged to so fish and hunt. This power was inherent in the sovereignty of the State over the lands where the privilege was exercised.

This case cites as authority for that proposition United States v. Winans, 49 L.ed. 1089.

In Kennedy, supra, the use of the words "in common with" meant, in my opinion, that the Seneca Indians by reason of their Treaty could hunt and fish as any other person and in the same manner as any other persons, but that they had no greater right to, nor any right to be regulated differently from all others.

At that early date, 1917, the U. S. Supreme Court did establish a State's right to conserve its fish resources for the use of all who had a right or privilege to fish within its boundaries.

In the case of The Puyallup Tribe v. Dept. of Game, supra, (Puyallup I), at page 693, the U. S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that position when it held:

> "Moreover, the right to fish at those respective places is not an exclusive one. Rather, it is one 'in common with all citizens of the Territory.' Certainly the right of the latter may be regulated. And we see no reason why the right of the Indians may not be regulated by an appropriate exercise of the

> police power of the State. The right to fish 'at all usual and accustomed' places may, of course, not be qualified by the state, even though all Indians born in the United States are now citizens of the United States."

The language in this opinion clearly, specifically and positively interprets the Medicine Creek Treaty to mean that the Treaty rights of these Indians to fish off reservation are not exclusive. They are to be exercised in common with all citizens of the Territory.

The rights of the citizens of the Territory can be regulated and so can the Indians.

In my opinion the only logical conclusion from this language is that fishing off reservation by non-Treaty Indians is to be shared with all the citizens just as though the Indians were citizens.

The phrase "in common with" is, again, in my opinion, a very simple, easily understood and comprehensive term.

The word "common" by definition means "of or relating to a community at large (as a family unit, social group, tribe, political organization or alliance) generally shared or participated in by individuals of a community: not limited to one person or special group."

I have in my personal law library a volume printed in 1793 entitled, "A New Abridgement of the Law." Its author was Matthew Bacon of the Middle Temple, Esq. On page 385 of that volume he defines the general law of "Common" and thereafter treats it in its various applications to page 394.

It is apparent from this ancient work that the law regarding "common" developed when many persons used another's property for pasturage of their animals. No one had any individual right greater than another's; common of piscary, the right of taking fish in another's fish pond, pool or river is specifically referred to on page 384.

Also see "An American Dictionary of the English Language," by Noah Webster dated 1828.

That definition has as its clear thrust and impact that a right in common

belongs to no one man but belongs equally to more than one, or to many indefinitely, as: life and sense are common to man and beast, or: the common privileges of citizens, the common wants of man. That is, a right in common belongs to the public; it has no separate owner.

Copies of that work are attached to this opinion. [See pages C-60-61 infra].

The derivation of the word "common" convinces me this is the proper definition.

I have read all the available material concerning the background leading up to the explanation of this proposed treaty by Governor Stevens and its eventual signature by all concerned. They are exhibits in this case. I insisted that I read the original records myself rather than rely on an interpretation of someone else.

Exhibit 74-31 is the "Record of the Proceedings of the Commission to Hold Treaties with the Indian Tribes in Washington Territory and the Blackfoot Country."

That document establishes that the Treaty was read section by section to the

Indians by the interpreter. There was no objection.

On page 8 of these records kept by James Doty the following reason was given for the formulation of Article III to the time of the meeting held with the Indians:

> "It was also thought necessary to allow them to fish at all accustomed places, since this would not in any way interfere with the rights of citizens, and was necessary for the Indians to obtain a subsistence."

This was Doty's explanation as to why this provision was placed in the Treaty. I have yet to see any reference to this document or this explanation any place in any analysis of the meaning of this phrase. But it clearly establishes in my mind that this was the explanation made to these Indians of Art. III of the Treaty. No reference is made to any different or greater rights on any reservation that might thereafter be established.

In these preliminary drafts of the proposed Treaty provision, Art. III was

differently stated. It was designated Art. II and stated:

> "Art. II. There is however reserved to the use of said tribes the following tracts, viz.:
>
> "The right of fishing at common and accustomed places is further secured to them; Proviso against states or claims.
>
> "May be removed from one reservation to another on payment for improvements and cost of removal."

At that time the phrase "in common with citizens of the Territory" was not included. The inclusion in the Treaty itself in Art. III, coupled with the explanation by James Doty, clearly convinces me that this Treaty was to grant the Indians the same rights of every citizen to fish outside of the reservation, nothing more but nothing less. Since the Indians were not citizens it seems apparent that was the plain intent of the article.

Governor Stevens in his address to this group advised them that the whites were coming, some to build mills, some to make farms and some to fish. He advised them it was the Great Father's wish that the Indians have homes, pasture for their horses and fishing places. The Great Father wanted them to learn to farm and the children to go to school.

The purport of the Treaty as explained and agreed to expressed the desire of the United States to alter tribal life to the extent they should become farmers and their children should attend schools. All plans were to integrate them into a pattern of life different than they had followed for generations. Those plans were satisfactory to these Indians.

This was fully explained to them by Governor Stevens on December 25, 1854 through interpreters. On the next day it was again explained to them by Governor Stevens through an interpreter.

Thus, the Treaty was read by section by section and explained to the Indians by an interpreter and every opportunity was given them to discuss it. The Indians did discuss it and then they signed it. I am satisfied from the evidence

that the Indians understood when they were told that they would be placed on reservations and would also be surrendering their claims to the rest of the land. In my opinion the remarks of Governor Stevens contained relatively simple concepts readily understood by these Indians who had been in contact from some years with the whites, both socially and commercially. All of the evidence supports this opinion.

Common ownership and common use of property were recognized and accepted aspects of Indian culture.

I am, therefore, convinced that this phrase in this Treaty, "The right to taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory," gave the right to these Indians to fish to the same extent as any other citizen of the territory and that there was no division of ownership of fish in any fashion granted. I reach this conclusion from the decisions already cited and the plain meaning of the term.

The defendants have urged this court to accept the definition of this phrase formulated by Judge George H. Boldt in the case of United States of America vs. The Puyallup Tribe, et al. [sic] See Exh. 74-B.

In that decision, at page 38, the phrase "in common with" is defined as follows:

> "By dictionary definition and as intended and used in the Indian Treaty and in this decision 'in common with' means sharing equally the opportunity to take fish[29] at 'usual and accustomed grounds and stations'; therefore, non-treaty fisherman shall have the opportunity to take up to 50% of the harvestable number of fish that may be taken by all fisherman at usual and accustomed grounds and stations and treaty right fisherman shall have the opportunity to take up to the same percentage of harvestable fish, as stated above."

I must respectfully disagree with that definition.

On page 30 of that opinion Judge Boldt refers to the philosophy of Congress referred to in the evidence

submitted in the case he heard. He there states:

> ". . . this case presents an appropriate opportunity to take a step toward applying congressional philosophy to Indian Treaty right fishing in a way that will not be inconsistent with Puyallup-I and Puyallup II and also will provide ample security for interest and purpose of conservation."

The applicable principle for construing Indian Treaty language has been stated by the United States Supreme Court as follows:

> Judicial authority to interpret Treaties:
>
> "It is our responsibility to see that the terms of the treaty are carried out, so far as possible, in accordance with the meaning they were understood to have by the tribal represen-

tatives at the council, and in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent people. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684, 86 L.ed. 1115, 62 S.Ct. 862 (1942). But see New York ex rel. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556, 60 L.ed. 1166, 36 S.Ct. 705 (1916)."

In view of this principle of judicial interpretation it is my opinion his position has granted rights to all of these Treaty Indians contrary to those established by former decisions of the United States Supreme Court in regard to off-reservation fishing rights.

He has interpreted this phrase to mean that all of these Treaty Indians have a prior right to take 50% of the harvestable fish and that this right is one that is to be exercised prior to any fishery in off-reservation waters by other citizens of the Territory. (State) That this is an exclusive right to be exercised by these Treaty Indians.

In my opinion this interpretation is directly contrary to the ruling in Dept. of Game v. The Puyallup Tribe, et al. (Puyallup II), supra which has clearly stated at page 693:

> "Moreover, the right to fish at those respective places is not an exclusive one. Rather, it is one 'in common with all citizens of the Territory.'"

Respective places here referred to "at all ususal and accustomed places."

It must be clearly recognized that these Puyallup Indians have no claim to any reservation rights outside of a section of the Puyallup River.

I have made this comparison with Judge Boldt's decision for two reasons: One is that it was the position urged by the defendants. I felt the reason why I decided differently should be clearly stated.

The other reason is that the defendants apparently take the position that I was bound by Judge Boldt's decision.

It is my opinion Judge Boldt's decision is not controlling on the issue before me. The United States Supreme Court directed this court to allocate steelhead on the Puyallup River between Treaty and non-Treaty fishermen.

It is my understanding of the law that since these partices are before this court that problem is to be resolved by this court. In this circumstance no other court has jurisdiction of this subject matter at this time.

Thus the order of this court in this lawsuit will extend to the Treaty rights of the Puyallup Indians on the Puyallup River in regard to fishing for steelhead.

RESERVATION STATUS

The trial court in the original action made the following Findings of Fact:

"XII

"All of the lands within the exterior boundaries of the old Puyallup Indian Reservation were sold, in fee simple absolute, pursuant to an act of Congress (33 Stat. 565) with the exception of two small tracts which are presently being utilized as a cemetery for members of the federal organization known as the 'Puyallup Tribe.' The total acreage remaining in trust status is approximately 22 acres. The original reservation was in excess of 18,000 acres.

"XIII

"That the individual defendants began openly fishing the Puyallup River in 1953 contrary to the laws, rules and regulations of

the State of Washington. Since that time, the defendants have gradually increased the intensity of their drift net and set net fisheries, using modern nylon monofilament nets, to the point that the anadromous fish runs of the Puyallup River are presently unable to maintain themselves in an abundant supply without supplemental plantings by the state.

"XIV

"The Puyallup River from Commencement Bay to its upper tributaries constitutes and is a prime spawning and rearing area for anadromous fish.

"XV

"The defendants have indicated that unless unrestrained from so doing, they will continue to fish in the

Puyallup River and Commencement Bay in the manner in which their fishing activities have taken place since 1953.

"XVI

"That the place, time, and manner of fishing by the defendants was and is in violation of the rules, and regulations of the State of Washington. That the fisning activities of the defendants, if allowed to proceed unrestrained could result in the destruction or serious impairment of the anadromous fish runs of the Puyallup River.

"XVII

"That once anadromous fish runs in a river system have been destroyed, it is generally impossible to re-establish them.

"XVIII

"It is reasonable and necessary that state conservation, rules and regulations be uniformly applied to all citizens on an equal basis including the defendants."

From the Findings of Fact the Court made the following Conclusions of Law:

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

"II

". . .That the Puyallup Indian Reservation no longer exists and that the state has assumed total and complete jurisdiction over all lands situated within its boundaries.

"III

"That the anadromous conservation program of the State of Washington, as it affects the Puyallup River watershed and

Commencement Bay, is an integral and necessary part of an overall state conservation and preservation program for anadromous fish.

"IV

"It is reasonable and necessary that state conservation, rules and regulations be uniformly applied to all citizens on an equal basis including the defendants.

"V

"That the permit the defendants to fish as they have done since 1953, and as they would do in the future if not restrained, would seriously hamper and ultimately destroy the effectiveness of the state's conservation program, particularly as applied to the Puyallup River watershed and Commencement Bay.

I set those forth because they are still the law of this case in regard to those issues that have not been reversed by an appellate court.

So far as this case is concerned the Finding that the Puyallup Indian Reservation no longer exists has not been reversed. The United States Supreme Court did not reach a decision on that issue. I believe it is still for that body to determine, based on the evidence presented at the original trial of this matter. State v. Satiacum, 414 U.S. 1, 38 L.ed.2d 1, 94 S.Ct. _____, does not in my opinion reverse that finding.

Those Findings also determine that these defendants were fishing the Puyallup River to the extent that the anadromous fish runs of the Puyallup River were unable to maintain themselves in an abundant supply without supplemental plantings by the State of Washington. In other words that fishery was depleting the natural run of steelhead.

These Findings also determine that the fishing activities of the defendants, if allowed to proceed unrestrained, could result in the destruction, or serious impairment of the anadromous fish runs of the Puyallup River. They also determined

that once this run is destroyed it is generally impossible to re-establish.

Those Findings of Fact have never been reversed.

The status of this case then is that these defendants were fishing this river in violation of the conservation policies of the State of Washington and were in the process of destroying the anadromous fish run of this river. I believe that the United States Supreme Court has recognized that fact. In my opinion, it was for this reason that the Court ruled the Treaty of Medicine Creek did not grant a federal right to these Indians to destroy or deplete this fish run, and that the State did have authority to prevent the destruction or depletion.

Each Indian Treaty must be separately considered, for the language is not the same in every Treaty, rendering the rights and obligations of the parties different. The case of Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 37 L.ed.2d 92, 93 S.Ct. 2245, established the proposition that the question of extinguishment of an Indian Reservation depends upon the facts of each case and the intention of Congress.

I have read the case of U. S. v. Washington, 496 F.2d 620. That case was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The United States Supreme Court has now declined to hear an appeal by the State of Washington in that case. This would indicate that the prior determination by Judge Cochran concerning the non-existence of the Puyallup Indian Reservation will be reversed by the United States Supreme Court. I accordingly accept that position.

This does not, in my opinion, dispose of the question remaining for solution, namely, the allocation of steelhead between Treaty and non-Treaty parties of the Puyallup River in its entirety.

In U. S. v. Wash., supra, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appealls stated simply the Puyallup Indian Reservation continued to exist. That holding was based on the case of Mattz v. Arnett, supra.

The Mattz case was a prosecution for violation of a state statute prohibiting the use of gill nets. It did establish that the Klamath River Indian Reservation was "Indian Country," within the meaning

of 18 USC §1151. That entire section is devoted to the jurisdiction of states over "Indian Country."

At page 95 of that opinion the court stated:

> "We now reverse. The reversal, of course, does not dispose of the underlying forfeiture issues. On remand, the questions relating to the existence of Mattz' fishing rights and to the applicability of California law notwithstanding reservation status will be addressed. We intimate no opinion on those issues."

It appears to me the question relating to the existence and extent of the fishing rights of the Puyallup Tribe within this reservation area is still a matter for determination by this court in regard to steelhead fishery.

This Treaty did not give these Indians the right to so conduct their fishery on their reservation property to the extent that it would damage or destroy the fish run that entered the Puyallup River.

These Indians now contend that since this reservation has been determined to still exist, they have the sole right, within the 7-mile area of the Puyallup River within the boundaries of their reservation, to fish as they desire and no one has any regulatory authority over them or the fish in this river. As a consequence, the fishing of the Puyallup Indians within that 7-mile area can be carried on in any manner they choose, and they can take all the fish they desire to the exclusion of all others. They also contend that they can take all of the harvestable fish that pass through that reservation area and that no other person has any right to any fish on the Puyallup River. This would give then complete control of, and ownership of, all anadromous fish in the entire Puyallup River system. No one else could take any fish without endangering the survival of the species. This would practically make the Puyallup River system the fish farm for these Indians alone.

I do not believe this Treaty ever contemplated such a situation.

In the Treaty of Medicine Creek, these Indians were given the right to fish in common with all citizens of the Territory. That right to fish has been

determined to be solely that since the Treaty did not provide otherwise. It was silent as to the manner of fishing, the size of the take and the restriction of commercial fishing.

It was also silent as to the amount of fish that could be taken. It did not by its terms grant to these Indians all of the fish that entered the Puyallup River, nor any specific quantity of fish. This Treaty did not give these Indians the right to fish in their usual and accustomed manner.

The Puyallup River was their ancestral home. The establishment of the Reservation by Executive Orders did not enlarge those Treaty rights. Both parties to this Treaty were aware that fish entering the Puyallup River went upstream to spawn and that their continued existence in this river was naturally dependent upon this situation.

Both parties were aware that the Reservation would not include the vast reaches of the Puyallup River (See map of the Puyallup River, Exh. 74-1. ((The approximate boundaries of the former reservation are outlined in pink.))) All parties were aware that fishing on this river would be conducted by both Treaty

and non-Treaty fishermen and that all parties fishing in this river should not jeopardize the natural fish run. It was for their mutual benefit to retain this important food source.

It only makes common sense that both parties understood the situation and that they both intended that neither would destroy or damage this marvelous natural bounty. It was not the intent of this Treaty that these Indians would have a right to all the fish that entered the Puyallup River. It was the intent of both parties that these Indians, and all others, were entitled to take a fair portion of the fish entering the Puyallup River going upstream to spawn.

Certainly if the non-Treaty parties were to take action which would prevent any migration into the Puyallup River, or to prevent fish from moving downstream through the old reservation area, these Indians would complain that this was a Treaty violation and, therefore, unlawful. These Indians would expect the courts to protect their Treaty rights. They would receive that protection.

These same Indians now take the position that they alone have the absolute right to destroy, or deplete, the

fish in this river, and that they have no obligation to see that this run is maintained. They also take the position that only Treaty Indians have any right to fish in the Puyallup River.

This is not the law in my opinion.

The question of conservation of fishery resources in its application to Indian reservations is a new one and has not been resolved at this time.

I am convincted that the United States Supreme Court will take the position that there is no federal right and thus no Treaty right by the Indians on this river to fish without some limitation. This limitation may be imposed either by a state court or by a Washington State regulation.

I am also convinced that the United States Supreme Court will hold that these Treaty Indians have only a right to fish for a fair portion of all fish passing through this reservation area consistent with the number of fish naturally propogated in this area.

In my opinion that is exactly what this Treaty meant, and the parties intended it to mean, when it was signed.

This interpretation does recognize the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent people. It does conserve the natural fish run so that no one on this river can destroy or deplete it. Future generations of Puyallup Indians, and others, will be equally benefitted by this determination.

Otherwise these Indians today could take so much of the fish run that it would deplete it. From the Findings of Fact entered in this case that is exactly what they were doing when this case was originally heard. Their action at that time was contrary to the long-term interests of future generations of the Puyallup Indians. It certainly appears apparent that these future generations need protection of this vital fish resource.

That is not a case in which a lake is completely surrounded by an Indian reservation, where no question of others' rights is involved.

It is for that reason, I believe, the United States Supreme Court in its prior decisions in this case stated that the Treaty rights of these Indians extended <u>only to the natural run and that fishermen on this river were to share that run with the Treaty Indians</u>.

Even though this area is determined to be still reservation property and these Indians thereby could deny access to others on this 7-mile area of the river, it is obvious there is a vast area where such fishing can be accomplished by non-Treaty fishermen. It appears that the placement of this reservation at the mouth of the Puyallup River was never intended by <u>either party</u> to grant to these Indians the Treaty right to catch all of the fish that entered the Puyallup River on their way to spawn upstream. If this was the intention it could very easily have been so provided in the Treaty or the Executive Orders that established this reservation.

It is obvious from the Treaty itself that no white man could enter the reservation without proper consent. Within that reservation area these Indians had the exclusive right to fish in the Puyallup River. Fish caught there were theirs. But they did not convey to these Indians ownership of all the fish that entered the Puyallup River and were bound upstream to spawn through this area.

The upstream owners and the public also have certain rights and responsibilities. These non-Treaty parties have no right to monopolize these fish nor to

damage the natural run in this river. They in turn have the right to catch a fair portion of the fish that enter this river. These rights, of course, are subject to control by the State of Washington.

See 47 ALR 2d 370, 35 Am. Jur.2d Fish and Game, §6 through §21, pages 630 through 664.

In my opinion it was the intent of both parties to this Treaty that these Indians would fish within the reservation exclusively, but that they would not take so many fish that they would deprive upstream owners of a fair portion of that fish run, and that both parties would conduct their own fishery so that the natural fish run would not be progressively depleted.

Whether the State of Washington has the right to regulate fishing in the reservation area does not appear controlling. This court has the authority to allocate and regulate Treaty fishery in this area. This case was brought to determine the extent of the Treaty rights of these Indians and thus the resolution of that issue is within the issues presented to this court. The United States Supreme Court remanded this case to this

court to make an allocation of the natural steelhead run between Treaty Indians and other fishermen.

The Supreme Court ruled that these Indian Treaty rights could be controlled by the need to conserve a specie [sic]. The trial court in the original trial of this matter specifically found that the fishing activity of these Indians was in the process of damaging the runs of anadromous fish and that the fish runs were in danger of extinction or depletion.

It certainly appears from the testimony of Ms. Bennett, Chairwoman and member of the legislative body of the Puyallup Tribal Council, that these Indians historically fished in a manner guaranteeing that fish would get back to their natural spawning areas. Thus, there was never any intent to destroy any steelhead run (St. 761). Ms. Bennett also testified that the Tribe's prior regulations were based on good judgment and common sense. (St. 762)

The regulations of the Tribal Council itself recognize the need for escapement (St. 768).

The present Tribal policy was stated by Ms. Bennett to be that "the Tribe does not plan to significantly nor dispropor-

tionately change prior patterns of steelhead harvests, and that the Puyallup River should continue to provide a favorable sports fishing stream in both its metropolitan settings and its more secluded rural reaches." (St. 770-771, Exh. Q)

It was her testimony also that this Tribe planned to take ninety to one hundred per cent of the steelhead run available for harvest because the steelhead all go through the Puyallup reservation. (St. 733)

This intention appears to me to be contrary to the prior rulings of the United States Supreme Court and the statement of Tribal policy.

These Indians plan independently to determine the size of the steelhead run and would allow such escapement as they determine to preserve the steelhead run. In this context they do not differentiate between naturally propogated and hatchery propogated steelhead. It is their position that these are all steelhead and their rights extend to all such fish regardless of origin.

This would then mean that no owner upstream, or the other citizens of the

State of Washington, could fish for steelhead at all because any such fishing would deplete the remaining run of steelhead these Indians had allowed to escape.

Thus the State program, entirely financed by the sports fisherman of this State, would be entirely pre-empted by Treaty Indian fishery.

Ms. Bennett readily agreed that protection of the fish run was a necessity and that the Puyallup Tribe had their own conservation plan. She further agreed that the definition of the word "conservation" was that as set forth in pages 4 and 5 of this opinion.

It is apparent then that conservation is recognized as a necessity by all parties. The real issue is who establishes the number of fish that can be caught and by whom.

I am of the opinion that the United States Supreme Court specifically recognized the obvious need to conserve the steelhead run on this river. Accordingly it stated:

> "The aim is to accommodate the rights of Indians under the Treaty

and the rights of other people."

It is my opinion that the court held that the Medicine Creek Treaty did not grant the federal right to these Indians to destroy the natural run of steelhead by progressive depletion. Accordingly, it is my understanding of these decisions that the Indians have no exclusive right to the fish in this river. They share in common that right and the fish that enter the river with non-Treaty parties.

The Indian right to commercially fish for steelhead with nets and the rights of other people to fish for steelhead with hook and line must be accommodated.

The rights of the Indians can be controlled by the State of Washington for proper conservation. This Treaty does not give these Indians a federal right to pursue the steelhead to extinction. Therefore the State can enforce reasonable restrictions on the commercial fishing of Indians even though the fish pass through a portion of the river that would be designated within the boundaries of an Indian Reservation. To interpret that decision otherwise would be to allow these Indians the right they claim, that

is, to fish in any way they choose and to take as many fish as they desire. This would give them the right within the reservation boundaries to destroy the steelhead run. This right is not given to them by their Treaty.

In regard to hatchery-propogated steelhead, these fish are in effect entitled to safe passage through any such reservation boundaries because these Indians have no Treaty rights to these fish. In other words they cannot fish with nets for these fish. They must fish for them as any other fisherman in accordance with State authorized equipment. They need not be licensed. These Indians cannot sell them commercially.

The only practical method of allocation is to determine what percentage of the steelhead run are naturally-propagated and what percentage are hatchery-propagated.

As to the percentage naturally propagated these are to be allocated. As to the allocation to these Treaty Indians, they can fish for those with nets and sell them commerically.

To accomplish this division it is necessary that they court establish that

division and the number of fish to be taken by both parties.

ALLOCATION OF THE NATURAL STEELHEAD RUN

During this trial the only figures as to run size were offered by the State of Washington; it has the burden of establishing that fact.

These facts establish that of the actual steelhead caught and examined, 50% appeared to be of the naturally spawned variety and 50% appeared to be of the hatchery spawned variety.

The hatchery spawned variety were identified by a subbed dorsal fin. Both parties agreed to the existence of this characteristic.

Additionally facts further established that the smolt population that goes to sea are in equal numbers. The naturally propogated smolt are in the same number as the hatchery propogated steelhead. Thus an escapement, that is a return to spawn, would be 50% naturally propogated and 50% hatchery propogated.

The statistics in regard to run size are not precise. This is at best an imprecise operation. I took an average over a 10-year period from 1964 to 1973. Sportsmen caught a total of 118,663 steelhead in that period, an average of 11,866 fish per year. There were no Indian figures available. But during the 10-year period from 1954 to 1963 the total Indian catch reported was 27,140, an average Indian catch of 2,714 per year. The Department of Game felt these Indian catch figures were fairly accurate. In addition, the evidence disclosed that the steelhead run over the past 10 years has been fairly constant, although a decline has been noted in the past 2 years. Of course the State has continued to plant steelhead produced by its hatchery program.

In that regard I find that this hatchery program is financed entirely from funds received from sports fishermen for licenses and punch cards. No federal funds are spent on the program which involves the Puyallup River planting of steelhead raised in the South Tacoma Fish Hatchery.

In the 10-year period from 1954 to 1963 sports and Indian fishery caught a total of 145,811 steelhead, or an average

of 14,581 per year. This 10-year period establishes that this river will support an average yearly run of combined natural and hatchery propogated steelhead of 29,162. That figure represents the total yearly average run of steelhead. That figure is arrived at by doubling the catch estimate to arrive at the total run in order to establish a catch and an escapement determination. One-half of that number must be allowed to escape to spawn so that that run size will not be depleted. That leaves one-half, or 14,581, subject to be caught or harvested.

In this connection, since there is an even return of natural and hatchery-reared steelhead, 7,290 are natural and 7,290 are hatchery-reared steelhead. So that of the 14,581 steelhead subject to harvest 7,290 are hatchery reared and the Indians have no Treaty right to net any of these fish nor to sell them commercially. This number is subject to hook and line fishing only. Indians, of course, can fish for these, but only with regular gear, and not with nets, spears or any other method which differs from that allowed by the sports fishermen.

Of the remaining 50% that I have allocated to natural propogation [sic], 7,290, the United States Supreme Court has

directed allocation to be made between Treaty Indians and others.

In this connection, it must be kept in mind that, despite prior classification by the State of Washington of this steelhead as a game fish, these Indians have the right to net these steelhead and sell them commercially.

The Puyallup Indians numbered approximately 100 in 1854, at the time the Treaty was executed. (Finding of Fact IV). All of them lived from fishing.

At this time there are 20 regular Treaty Indian fishermen on this river. An additional 20 do parttime fishing. Some 20 more derive some support from these 40.

It certainly must be also kept in mind that earning a living from this activity is to be considered more important than fishing for recreation.

Accordingly, to allocate this natural run of steelhead between sports and Treaty fishermen, that factor has to be given considerable weight. I believe I must also recognize that these Indians are chiefly interested in the commercial catch and not in any sports fishing for

steelhead. Another factor I considered was that the hatchery planting program does increase the natural run. A hatchery propogated [sic] steelhead that returns to spawn, and does in fact spawn, contributes to the naturally propogated [sic] run.

In view of these factors, the number of Treaty Indians and sports fishermen involved, I would allocate 45% of those fish to the Treaty Indians, or a catch of 3,280. That would leave a catch of the natural run of 4,010 for the sports fishermen. The sports fishermen will also be fishing for steelhead in the hatchery propogated steelhead of 7,290.

I realize that no fish can be segregated prior to the time it is caught. But I believe since the return of steelhead is equally divided between natural and hatchery reared, it will work out so that each group will be catching half natural and half hatchery propogated [sic] fish.

To control this catch the defendant is to take a count of the steelhead caught and report it to this court to see that they stay within that limit. The fishing season of these Indians will be twice as long as it was last year, but in no event can they take over 3,280

steelhead.

The sports fishery will be of the same duration as last year and the State will take at least two (2) creel census to determine sports fishery on this take and they shall likewise stay within that limit.

The State of Washington Department of Game is to continue their planting of smolts in this river as it has in the past.

This allocation will continue until further order of this court. A yearly review of all catch figures will be made by this court because Indians net fishery for steelhead has been prohibited for years, and this will have to be monitored to make certain it will not deplete the run.

The fishing by defendants is to be carried on only by duly enrolled members of the Puyallup Tribe. That roll must be properly authenticated and filed with this court to determine the number and names of the fishermen so that only properly eligible fisherman, who in fact have these Treaty rights, are so fishing in this area. That roll must be filed with this court within thirty (30) days

of the date the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are signed by this court.

I have read a great number of cases which I have not referred to in this opinion, nor attempted to point out distinguishing features. I hope to have those cases listed and available at the time the Findings of Fact are signed in this matter.

Dated at Tacoma, Washington, this 23rd Day of December, 1974.

S/ W. L. BROWN, JR.
J U D G E

AN

AMERICAN DICTIONARY

OF THE

ENGLISH LANGUAGE;

CONTAINING

THE WHOLE VOCABULARY OF THE FIRST EDITION IN TWO VOLUMES QUARTO; THE ENTIRE CORRECTIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS OF THE SECOND EDITION IN TWO VOLUMES ROYAL OCTAVO;

TO WHICH IS PREFIXED

AN INTRODUCTORY DISSERTATION

ON THE ORIGIN, HISTORY, AND CONNECTION, OF THE LANGUAGES OF WESTERN ASIA AND EUROPE, WITH AN EXPLANATION OF THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH LANGUAGES ARE FORMED.

BY NOAH WEBSTER, LL.D.,

Member of the American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia; Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in Massachusetts; Member of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences; Fellow of the Royal Society of Northern Antiquaries in Copenhagen; Member of the Connecticut Historical Society; Corresponding Member of the Historical Societies in Massachusetts, New York, and Georgia; of the Academy of Medicine in Philadelphia, and of the Columbian Institute in Washington; and Honorary Member of the Michigan Historical Society.

GENERAL SUBJECTS OF THIS WORK.

I.—ETYMOLOGIES OF ENGLISH WORDS, DEDUCED FROM AN EXAMINATION AND COMPARISON OF WORDS OF CORRESPONDING ELEMENTS IN TWENTY LANGUAGES OF ASIA AND EUROPE.

II.—THE TRUE ORTHOGRAPHY OF WORDS, AS CORRECTED BY THEIR ETYMOLOGIES.

III.—PRONUNCIATION EXHIBITED AND MADE OBVIOUS BY THE DIVISION OF WORDS INTO SYLLABLES, BY ACCENTUATION, BY MARKING THE SOUNDS OF THE ACCENTED VOWELS, WHEN NECESSARY, OR BY GENERAL RULES.

IV.—ACCURATE AND DISCRIMINATING DEFINITIONS, ILLUSTRATED, WHEN DOUBTFUL OR OBSCURE, BY EXAMPLES OF THEIR USE, SELECTED FROM RESPECTABLE AUTHORS, OR BY FAMILIAR PHRASES OF UNDISPUTED AUTHORITY.

REVISED AND ENLARGED,

BY CHAUNCEY A. GOODRICH,

PROFESSOR IN YALE COLLEGE.

WITH PRONOUNCING VOCABULARIES OF SCRIPTURE, CLASSICAL, AND GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES.

TO WHICH ARE NOW ADDED

PICTORIAL ILLUSTRATIONS,

TABLE OF SYNONYMS, PECULIAR USE OF WORDS AND TERMS IN THE BIBLE, APPENDIX OF NEW WORDS, PRONOUNCING TABLE OF NAMES OF DISTINGUISHED PERSONS, ABBREVIATIONS, LATIN, FRENCH, ITALIAN, AND SPANISH PHRASES, ETC.

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1862.

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

5. To come putting that, *but* a contrast; to which; followed by with, a Latinism.

But to a lover's ear what could with this compare? [Love and.] *Shen.*

6. To give in a state of hostility or inconformity. "*Commit* steel and bone mails." But this seems to be the same signification as the foregoing.

7. To expose or endanger by a preliminary step or stretch which can not be recalled, as, to commit the peace of a country by espousing the cause of a belligerent.

The people have manifested every desire of perfect friendship with us consistently with the honor of your sovereign. *Jefferson.*

8. To engage; to pledge; or to pledge by implication.

The general allowed them to fight, and to Gen. Howe's answering them assent as to the request, which could be granted or answering the task of the bravest foes. *Marshall.*

And with the reciprocal pronoun, to commit one's self, or *to do* some act, or make some declaration, which may bind the person in honor, good faith, or consistency, to pursue a certain course of conduct, or to adhere to the tenor of that declaration.

9. To refer or intrust to a committee, or select number of persons, for their consideration and report; *a term in legislation*; as, the petition or the bill is committed. Is it the pleasure of the house to commit the bill?

10. *To commit fully*, is to *commit* to prison *for* trial, in distinction from a temporary *commitment* while under examination. *Bouvier.*

COM-MIT'MENT, n. The act of committing; a sending to prison, a putting into prison; imprisonment. It is equivalent to *arrest* or *putting to* simply; as, a *commitment* to the Tower, or to Newgate; or, for the sake of brevity, omitting the name of the place, it is equivalent to *putting into prison*; as, the officer is censured by *commitment*.

2. An order *for* confining in prison. But more generally we use *mittimus*.

3. The act of referring or intrusting to a committee *for* consideration; *a term in legislation*; as, the *commitment* of a petition or a bill to a select number of persons for consideration and report.

4. The act of delivering in charge, or intrusting.

5. A doing, or perpetration, as of sin or a crime; commission. *Clarendon.*

6. The act of pledging or engaging; or the act of exposing or endangering. [See the verb, Nos. 7 and 8.] *Hamilton.*

COM-MIT'TAL, n. A pledge, actual or implied.

COM-MIT'TED, pp. Delivered in trust; given in charge; deposited; imprisoned; done, perpetrated; endured; exposed; *referred* to a committee.

To be committed, committed to prison for trial. [See Commit.]

COM-MIT'TEE, n. One or more persons elected or appointed, to whom any matter or business is referred, either by a legislative body or other branch of it, or by a court, or by any corporation, or by any society, or collective body of men acting together. In legislative bodies, a house or branch of that body may resolve or form itself into a committee, called a *committee of the whole house*, when the speaker leaves the chair, and one of the members acts as chairman. *Standing committees* are such as continue during the existence of the legislature, and to them are committed all matters that fall within the purview of their appointment; as, the *committee of elections*, or *of privileges*, &c. *Special committees* are appointed to consider and report on particular subjects.

COM-MIT'TEE-SHIP, n. The office and profit of committees. *Milton.*

COM-MIT'TER, n. One who commits; one who does or perpetrates. *South.*

COM-MIT'TI-BLE, a. That may be committed. [*Little used.*] *Lewis.*

COM-MIT'TING, *ppr.* Giving in trust; depositing; imprisoning; perpetrating; engaging; referring to a committee; exposing.

COM-MIX', v. t. [L. *commixtus*, *commutus*; *con* and *mixo*, to mix. [See Mix.]

To mix or mingle; to blend; to mix, as *dull* and *sub*stances. *Bacon. Morton.*

COM-MIX', v. i. To mix; to mingle. *Ash.*

COM-MIX'ED, (kom-mixt',) *pp.* Mixed; blended.

COM-MIX'ING, *ppr.* Mixing; blending.

COM-MIX'TION, (kom-mix'chun,) n. Mixture; a blending of different ingredients in one mass or aggregate. *Bacon.*

Commixture is used by Shakspeare, but is hardly legitimate.

COM-MIX'TURE, (kom-mix'tyur,) n. The act of mixing; the state of being mixed; the blending of ingredients in one mass or aggregate. *Locke.*

2. The mass formed by mixing different things; compound; compound. *Johnson. Burke.*

3. In *Scots law*, a confusion of moveable property, by blending different parcels belonging to different proprietors. *Erskine.*

COM-MODE', n. [Fr., from L. *commodus*, *con* and *modus*, manner; *con*, or *com*, and *modus*, manner.] A kind of head dress formerly worn by ladies. *Addison.*

2. A chest of drawers often with shelves added, and of various sizes.

COM-MO'DI-OUS, a. [*Fr. commode*; It. *comodo*; Sp. id.; L. *commodus*. See Mode.]

Convenient, suitable, fit, proper; adapted to its use or purpose, or to wants and necessities; as, a commodious house or room.

The house was so commodious to retire in.—*Arts and sc.* 14.

It is followed by *for* before a noun; as, a place *commodious for* a camp.

COM-MO'DI-OUS-LY, *adv.* Conveniently; in a commodious manner; suitably; in a manner to afford ease, or to post of inconvenience; as, a house *commodiously* situated; we may pass life *commodiously* without the luxuries of economy.

COM-MO'DI-OUS-NESS, n. Convenience; fitness; suitableness for the purpose; as, the *commodiousness* of a house or an apartment; the *commodiousness* of a situation for trade.

COM-MO'DI-TY, n. [L. *commoditas*; It. *comodità*; Fr. *commodité*; Sp. *comodidad*; Port. *commodidade*. See Commode.]

1. *Proximity*, convenience; profit; advantage; interest. "Men seek their own *commodity*." In the sense it was used by *Hooker*, *Sidney*, &c.; but this is nearly or wholly obsolete.

2. That which affords ease, convenience, or advantage; any thing that is useful, but particularly in commerce, including every thing movable that is bought and sold, goods, wares, or merchandise, produce of land and manufactures. Unless, perhaps, animals may be excepted, the word includes all the movables which are objects of commerce.

Commodities are movables, valuable by money, as common things. *Locke.*

The principal use of money is to ease the commerce of such commodities. *Arbuthnot.*

Staple commodities, are those which are the produce or manufacture of a country, and constitute the principal articles of exportation. Thus flour is the staple commodity of New York and Pennsylvania; flour and tobacco, of Maryland and Virginia; rotton and rice, of South Carolina and Georgia; cotton and sugar, of Louisiana.

COM'MO-DORE, n. [This word is probably a corruption of the Italian *comandatore*, a commander; or the Spanish *comendador*, a superior of a monastery, or a lord, who holds a commandery.]

1. The officer who commands a squadron or detachment of ships, destined on a particular enterprise. In the British navy, a naval officer having the temporary rank of a rear-admiral. *Encyc.*

2. A title given by courtesy to the senior captain, when two or more ships of war are cruising in company. *Totten.*

3. The convoy or leading ship in a fleet of merchantmen, which carries a light in her top to conduct the other ships.

COM-MO'DU-LATION, n. [L. *con* and *modulatio*.] Measure; agreement. [*Little used.*] *Hakewill.*

COM'MON, *adv.* [Contracted from *commonly*.] Commonly; usually. *Shak.*

COM'MON, a. [L. *communis*; Fr. *commun*; Arm. *comun*; It. *comune*; Sp. *comun*; Port. *commum*; Goth. *gamains*; Sax. *gemæne*; G. *gemein*; D. *gemeen*; Sw. *gemen*; Dan. *gemen*; Fr. *commun*; Goth. *gamains*, a fellow, a comrade. This word may be compounded of *con* and *mon*, *con*, the plural *con* being equivalent to *people* and *vulgus*. The Sax. *mæne* is evidently from the root of *mon*, which seems to belong to the root of *men*, and *mon* is of the same family. Here we see the connection between *common* and *man*, as *vulgus*, *vulgaris*, from *vulgus*, Eng. *folk*.]

1. Belonging equally to more than one, or to many indefinitely, or, in a wide sense, to mankind or to man and beast; the *common* privileges of citizens; the *common* wants of men.

2. Belonging to the public; having no separate owner. The road is a highway to *common*.

3. General, serving for the use of all; as, the *common* prayer.

4. Universal, belonging to all; as, the earth is and will be the *common* inheritance of mankind.

5. Usual, general, frequent, as, *common* report.

6. Usual, ordinary; as, the *common* operations of nature; the *common* forms of conveyance; the *common* use of a day.

7. Of no rank or superior excellence; ordinary. *Applied to men*, it expresses, but more, not distinguished by birth, character, or talents, as a *common* man; a *common* soldier. *Joined to things*, it expresses, and derives its force from the context; as, a *common* house, a house not distinguished by extent or any beauty; a *common* table, a table not provided with delicacies; a *common* dish, a dish not provided for use, which expresses something of contempt.

8. Prostitute; bawd; as, a *common* woman.

9. In *grammar*, such nouns as belong to all persons and genders, or to all of one gender, as, *parent*, *friend*, *child*, which belong to *he* both masculine and feminine; so, *parson*.

10. A woman bad, in *botany*, to one that produces both leaves and flowers; a *common* person, one that has no regard to modesty; a woman *promiscuously* and *indiscriminately* prostitute.

11. A woman bad, in *botany*, to one that produces both leaves and flowers; a *common* person, one that has no regard to modesty; a woman *promiscuously* and *indiscriminately* prostitute.

Common *sense*, or *common*, in mathematics, is a number of quantities that divide a number of other numbers or quantities without a remainder.

Common law: in *Great Britain* and the *United States*, the *unwritten law*, the law that derives its binding force from immemorial usage and universal reception, in distinction from the *written* or *statute law*. That body of rules, principles, and customs which have been received from our ancestors, and by which courts have been governed in their judicial decisions. The evidence of this law is to be found in the reports of these decisions, and the records of the courts. Some of these rules have originated in modes of action which are now laid, or on the forms and precedents of proceedings or charters; but a great portion of them originated in judicial decisions founded on natural justice and equity, or on local customs.

Common pleas: in *Great Britain*, one of the King's courts, now held in Westminster Hall. It consists of a chief justice and three other *justices*, and has cognizance of all civil causes, real, personal, or mixed, as well by original writ as by removal from the inferior courts. A writ of error, in the nature of an appeal, lies from this court to the King's Bench. *Blackstone.*

In *some of the American States*, a court of *common pleas* is an inferior court, whose jurisdiction is limited to a county, and is more limited as to amount in value. This court is commonly established in each county of a State, and its powers are defined by statute. It has jurisdiction of civil causes, and of most criminal offenses, but the final jurisdiction in many of the latter cases, especially in capital offenses, is in the superior court by appeal, or by writ of error.

Common prayer: the liturgy of the Church of England, which all the clergy of the church are required to use, under a penalty. *Encyc.*

Common recovery: a legal process for barring estates, tenants, &c. [See Recovery.]

Common seal: in *law*, the name given to those varieties of form, in which the manner or mode of the act of a corporation is expressed. *Encyc. Johnson.*

In common: equally with others, or with others; to be equally used or participated in by two or more persons, bodies or classes; as, lands held *in common*; to assign lands to two persons *in common*, or to them *in common*; we enjoy the benefits of Providence *in common*.

COM'MON, n. A tract of ground, the use of which is not appropriated to any individual, but belongs to the public, or to a society. Thus we say, the word is an open ground or space in a large city, reserved for public use.

2. In *law*, an open ground, or tract used for the use of which belongs equally to the inhabitants of a town or of a hundred, or to a certain number of persons, here or the public at large, or to the owner of one tract of a right which is appurtenant to another tract, as to feed cattle, or to cut wood, or the like, or to feed cattle on land of another, or to dig turf, or to cut wood, or the like, on a tract owned by a number of persons, or by the public.

Common, or profit of *common*, is, *profit à prendre*, appurtenant, *because of vicinage*, or *neighborhood*.

Common of pasture, is a right to be given to the owners or occupiers of another tract to put cattle to feed upon the land's waste, and upon the land of other persons within the same manor. This is a right of most universal extent.

Common appendant, may be annexed to lands in other hands, or parcel to other lands, to which the owner has a right of *commonage*, by prescription, but it can not be claimed only by occupation and usage and presumption.

Common because of vicinage, or neighborhood, is where the inhabitants of two towns have the privilege to feed their cattle, time out of mind, on the wastes of each other, without any grant for the privilege. This is a mutual grant.

Common in gross, or *at large*, is a right to feed cattle on another's land, but not by reason of any land which the owner of the cattle has, but by grant from the owner of the land, or by a person of a higher or more extensive right.

COM'MON, v. t. To have a joint right with others in common ground.

2. To board together, to eat at a table in common.

COM'MON, a. To. Common ship.

COM'MON-A-BLE, a. One who enjoys common, or has a right to feed cattle on another's land.

COM'MON-AGE, n. The right of feeding cattle on another's land.

2. The land held in common.

COM'MON-ALTY, n. The community; the body of citizens; the commons. *Milton.*

COM'MON-ER, n. One who has a right of common.

2. One of the common people; one who is not a nobleman; a commoner. *Shak.*

3. A student in the university of Oxford, England, who is not a nobleman, and who is supported at the common table.

COM'MON-ING, *ppr.* Having a joint right with others in common ground.

2. Boarding together, eating at a table in common.

COM'MON-LY, *adv.* Usually; frequently; ordinarily; commonly. *Bacon.*

COM'MON-NESS, n. Frequency; commonness. *Bacon.*

COM'MON-PLACE, n. One who enjoys common, or has a right to feed cattle on another's land.

COM'MON-PLACE, a. Trite; frequent; ordinary; vulgar; as, a *commonplace* remark.

COM'MON-PLACE, v. t. To register; to enter in a book, as a memorandum for future use.

COM'MON-PLACE BOOK, n. A book in which memorandums are entered for future use.

COM'MON-WEALTH, n. The whole community of citizens; the body politic; the state; the public; the people.

APPENDIX D

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR PIERCE COUNTY

DEPARTMENT OF GAME OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,	)	
Plaintiff,	)	No. 158069
vs.	)	FINDINGS OF FACT AND
PUYALLUP TRIBE, INC.,	)	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Defendant.	)	

THIS MATTER having come on regularly for trial commencing June 3, 1974, before the undersigned Judge of the above-entitled court pursuant to an amended petition for declaratory relief pursuant to the remand of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington in accordance with the United States Supreme Court decision in this matter, 414 U.S. 44, and the state Supreme Court decision in 80 Wn.2d 561, 497 P.2d 171. This action was previously considered by the Washington State Supreme Court in 70 Wn.2d 245, 422 P.2d 754, and by the United States Supreme

Court in 391 U.S. 392. The plaintiffs having been represented by the Honorable Slade Gorton, Attorney of the State of Washington, through Edward B. Mackie, Deputy Attorney General; the intervenor-plaintiff Northwest Steelheaders Council of Trout Unlimited and Gary Ellis, being represented by Don S. Willner and Vincent R. Larson; the intervenor-plaintiff Western Steelheaders, Inc. being represented by James Tannesen; the defendant Puyallup Tribe represented by the Honorable Stan Pitkin, United States Attorney for the Western District of Washington, Thomas P. Giere, Assistant United States Attorney, George D. Dysart, Assistant Regional Solicitor, United States Department of Interior, and William H. Rodgers, Jr.; and Mr. John Sennhauser appearing for defendant Ramona Bennett, chairperson of the Puyallup Tribal Council; and the Court having reviewed the files and records herein insofar as material to the instant proceedings and having heard extensive evidence, examined exhibits and reviewed briefs and pleadings and arguments by counsel and having entered a memorandum decision on December 19, 1974, now enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

I.

This action was commenced by the Department of Fisheries and Department of Game of the State of Washington in November, 1963. The Honorable John S. Cochran, Judge, Pierce County Superior Court, on August 13, 1965, following the trial, entered Findings of Fact, portions of which reads as follows:

* * * * * * * * * * *

"XII

"All of the lands within the exterior boundaries of the old Puyallup Indian Reservation were sold, in fee simple absolute, pursuant to an act of Congress (13 Stat. 561) with the exception of two small tracts which are presently being utilized as a cemetery for members of the federal organization known as the 'Puyallup Tribe.' The total acreage remaining in trust status is approximately 22 acres. The original reservation was in excess of

18,000 acres.

"XIII

"That the individual defendants began openly fishing the Puyallup River in 1953 contrary to the laws, rules and regulations of the State of Washington. Since that time, the defendants have gradually increased the intensity of their drift net and set net fisheries, using modern nylon monofilament nets, to the point that the anadromous fish runs of the Puyallup River are presently unable to maintain themselves in an abundant supply without supplemental plantings by the state.

"XIV

"The Puyallup River from Commencement Bay to its upper tributaries constitutes and is a prime spawning and rearing area for anadromous fish.

"XV

"The defendants have indicated that unless restrained from so doing, they will continue to fish the Puyallup River and Commencement Bay in the manner in which their fishing activities have taken place since 1953.

"XVI

"That the place, time and manner of fishing by the defendants was and is in violation of the rules, and regulations of the State of Washington. That the fishing activities of the defendants, if allowed to proceed unrestrained could result in the destruction or serious impairment of the anadromous fish runs of the Puyallup River.

"XVII

"That once anadromous fish runs in a river system have been destroyed, it is generally impossible to re-establish them.

"XVIII

"It is reasonable and necessary that state conservation, rules and regulations be uniformly applied to all citizens on an equal basis including the defendants.

"II

"That the federal organization known as 'the Puyallup Tribe of Indians" was not signatory to the Treaty of Medicine Creek and that any blood line descendants of the aboriginal Puyallup Tribe who also may be members of the present day federal organization have no rights by virtue of said treaty. That the guardian-ward relationship between the United States Government and the defendants was severed when the lands comprising the Puyallup Indian Reservation were authorized to be sold in 1903. That the Puyallup Indian Reservation no longer exists and that the state has assumed total and complete jurisdiction over all lands situated within its

boundaries.

"III

"That the anadromous fish conservation program of the State of Washington, as it affects the Puyallup River watershed and Commencement Bay, is an integral and necessary part of an overall state conservation and preservation program for anadromous fish.

"IV

"It is reasonable and necessary that state conservation rules and regulations be uniformly applied to all citizens on an equal basis including the defendants.

"V

"That to permit the defendants to fish as they have done since 1953, and as they would do in the future if not restrained, would seriously hamper

and ultimately destroy the effectiveness of the state's conservation program, particularly as applied to the Puyallup River watershed and Commencement Bay.

* * * * * * * * * * *

"Done in open court this thirteenth day of August, 1965.

"JOHN D. COCHRAN
JUDGE."

II.

Following the first Washington State Supreme Court decision, 70 Wn.2d 245, 422 P.2d 754 (1967), and the first United States Supreme Court decision, 391 U.S. 392, this proceeding was remanded to the Pierce County Superior Court, and following a trial, the Honorable Bartlett Rummel, Judge, Pierce County Superior Court, entered Findings of Fact of December 30, 1970.

III.

The Washington State Department of Game is charged by law with the responsibility for the management and conservation

of the steelhead resource in this state. Under Washington State law fishing for steelhead by non treaty parties is restricted to hook and line fishery, and the commercial sale of steelhead by these parties is prohibited. To manage and conserve this resource the Department has established a regulation for non-treaty fishermen that provides a limit of 30 steelhead per season per fishermen, 2 steelhead per day, and no more than 4 in possession at any given time. The Department has further established seasons which prohibit fishing at certain times and has closed specific areas to protect necessary spawning escapement for these fish. The Department has also promulgated reasonable regulations for the fishing by Treaty Indians for steelhead in the Puyallup River.

IV.

Steelhead fishermen are required to obtain an annual license ($7.50) and an annual steelhead punchcard ($2.00) with limited exceptions. Treaty Indians fishing within their ceded areas are not required to pay a fee and obtain a license. There is no discrimination or exclusion from their participation in the hook and line fishery for steelhead. The hunting and fishing license fees collected by the Department of Game are placed in the

state game fund and cannot be used for any purpose other than "the protection, propagation and restoration of wildlife and game and the expenses of administration of the department." These fees provide 75% - 80% of the operating funds of the Department of Game.

V.

Steelhead which is an anadromous Rainbow trout, naturally spawn in fresh water streams and rivers, including the Puyallup River. The vast majority of naturally propagated steelhead, two years after having been spawned in fresh water, migrate to salt water. Little is known of the life cycle of steelhead while in saltwater. Only approximately 10% of the migrating steelhead smolts return as adult steelhead to the fresh water of their origin, and the majority do so after two years in saltwater. All but a small percentage of the returning steelhead die following the spawning process in fresh water.

VI.

A native or natural run of steelhead requires that approximately 50% of the steelhead entering the river be available for spawning in order to replenish and perpetuate the steelhead run in the

watershed. Thus, in the Puyallup watershed the harvest or catch of native steelhead should not in the interest of conservation exceed 50% of the returning adult native steelhead.

VII.

A hook and line fishery for steelhead is relatively inefficient and thus the inefficiency of the fishery permits an adequate escapement of steelhead for spawning purposes which are necessary for conservation. The hook and line fishery does not require active daily management by a regulatory agency in order to conserve and protect the steelhead fishery.

VIII.

A net fishery in fresh water is an efficient means of harvesting steelhead and the efficiency of the fishing gear can result in the over-harvesting of steelhead, thus reducing the number of steelhead which are available for spawning purposes to less than that necessary for conservation. This fishery is subject to regulation by the Department of Game or this Court for the purposes of conservation and allocation.

IX.

The Department of Game has engaged for a number of years in a substantial hatchery program to enhance and increase the production of steelhead throughout the state of Washington. The hatchery program involves some 18 hatcheries and 9 rearing ponds with a capital replacement value of $33,652,241, and an annual operational cost (for the fiscal year July 1, 1972 to June 30, 1973) of $1,636,247. The Department of Game's program has an annual capacity of approximately 5,000,000 winter and summer run steelhead smolts per year. A smolt is a steelhead which has reached the stage of its development that it is ready to commence the migration to salt water and is normally 6-8" in length. The smolt are planted in rivers and streams throughout the state by this Department.

X.

The Department of Game commenced planting hatchery steelhead in the Puyallup River in 1933. All of the hatchery steelhead being planted in the Puyallup River are secured from a nearby state hatchery. The operation of this Department supplies these steelhead is virtually entirely financed from funds received from the sale of licenses and punch cards

to sports fishermen. Since 1963, the number of steelhead smolt planted in the Puyallup River has varied from a low of 57,000 to a high of 124,000, and in recent years the plants have been 75,000 and 68,000. The rate of return of adult steelhead from salt water to the fresh water or origin varies, but generally is approximately 10% of the native and hatchery smolts.

The hatchery smolts when planted by the Department in the Puyallup watershed are 6-8" in length, and their planting coincides with the natural outward migration of steelhead smolts. The hatchery-planted smolts spend very little time in the fresh water, normally not exceeding one week in the watershed.

XI.

The physical characteristics of the adult native steelhead and the adult hatchery steelhead are virtually the same. The adult hatchery steelhead enter the Puyallup River on their upstream migration in larger numbers than do the native steelhead early in the fishing season (i.e., December, January). Conversely, the adult native steelhead compose a higher proportion of the total run that occurs during the months of February and March. The hatchery-reared steelhead

are identifiable by dorsal fin damage and the growth rings on the fish scales. Creel censuses have been made to determine the percentage of hatchery steelhead in the Puyallup River for the 1962-1963, 1971-1972, and 1972-1973 fishing seasons. The percentage of hatchery adult steelhead to the total steelhead run has slight variations from year to year, but the censuses have established that slightly in excess of 50% of the recent steelhead runs in the Puyallup River consist of hatchery adult steelhead.

XII.

The annual adult steelhead run in the Puyallup River varies from year to year, but over a ten-year period, it has been relatively constant with the exception of a decline in the last two years. In the period from 1954-1963 the combined sports and Indian fishery caught a total of 147, 155 steelhead, or an average of 14,715 per year. Since the steelhead catch reflect 50% of the total run, this establishes that the Puyallup River will support an average yearly run of combined natural and hatchery propagated steelhead of 29,430. For the ten-year period from 1964 through 1973, the sports and Indian fishery caught a total of 120, 980 steelhead; however, the Indian catch statistics for that period are incomplete. On the basis of the 1954-63 steelhead run

sizes which are slightly larger than the more current statistics, the average annual run of steelhead consists of 14,715 hatchery fish and 14,715 natural steelhead. It is necessary for conservation to have a 50% escapement of the natural adult steelhead run. Thus, the average is 7,357 harvestable natural adult steelhead in the Puyallup River on an annual basis. The annual planting of steelhead smolt by the Department of Game permits a full 100% harvest of the hatchery-reared steelhead since the planting substitutes what would otherwise be necessary for spawning purposes.

XIII.

At the negotiations at the Treaty of Medicine Creek, Governor Stevens, on behalf of the United States government, advised the Indians that white citizens would come to Western Washington to build mills, make homes and engage in fishing, and the government wanted the Indians to learn to farm and have their children attend school, and the intention was to integrate the Indians into a pattern of life different from that they had followed in past generations, and that these plans were satisfactory to both parties.

XIV.

The purpose expressed by negotiators for the Treaty of Medicine Creek for the inclusion of the provision relating to Indian fishing rights in Article III was to allow the Indians to fish at all accustomed places since this would not interfere with the rights of citizens and was necessary for the Indians to obtain a subsistence.

XV.

There are presently 20 full time Puyallup tribal treaty fishermen, 20 part time fishermen, and an additional 20 who occasionally participate in the fishery. The Indian net fishery is for personal and commercial purposes and provides income for tribal members. The majority of this income is from salmon fishery. Income from steelhead fishery is very limited.

XVI.

This Court in the first trial of this matter concluded that the Puyallup Indian Reservation no longer exists. The United States Supreme Court, 391 U.S. 392, 395, note 1, specifically reserved ruling on that question. Subsequently, in Settacum v. Washington, 414 U.S. 1,

the United States Supreme Court vacated a judgment of the Washington State Supreme Court that the Puyallup Reservation had ceased to exist. More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. State of Washington, 496 F.2d 620 (cert. den. 47 L.ed. 2d 307), decided that the Puyallup Indian Reservation had not been terminated and extinguished. It is assumed, therefore, that this Reservation has not been extinguished and still exists. The extent of this existence has not been judicially determined.

XVII.

The Puyallup Reservation includes approximately a 7-mile stretch of the Puyallup River commencing near the mouth of the river. There are a number of fishing areas on the Puyallup River and its tributaries which are upstream from the reservation area.

XVIII.

The Puyallup Tribe currently intends to concentrate its fishing for steelhead within the boundaries of the reservation and have indicated an intention to take 90% of their steelhead harvest within that area.

XIX.

During the 1973-74 steelhead fishing season of 121 days, a creel census was taken on 57 days, interviewing fishermen on the Puyallup River. On those days 3,243 persons were observed engaging in the hook and line fishery on the Puyallup River. 5,171 persons engage in the hook and line fishery on the Puyallup River during an entire year.

XX.

The Department of Game promptly following the United States Supreme Court decision, 414 U.S. 44 (November 19, 1973) adopted regulations effective December 1, 1973, providing for gillnet fishing by Puyallup Tribal members on the Puyallup River.

XXI.

The Department of Game in order to carry out its management responsibilities in the interest of conservation of the steelhead resources must know the numbers and names of Puyallup tribal fishermen so that only such eligible tribal fishermen will be permitted to fish for steelhead by means other than a hook and line fishery.

XXII.

A fair apportionment or allocation of the harvestable natural adult steelhead on the Puyallup River is to permit the Puyallup Treaty Indians to have 45% of the harvestable natural steelhead in the Puyallup River, or an annual catch of 3,310 provided that the annual runs continue to be in approximately the same magnitude as that reflected in the Finding of Fact No. 12.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I.

The court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in this proceeding.

II.

The Department of Game of the State of Washington has the authority to manage and regulate the steelhead resource of the State of Washington. The Game Department's program is designed to preserve and increase the production of steelhead.

III.

The Department of Game's and the State of Washington's regulation and management of the hook and line fishery

for steelhead in the Puyallup River does not discriminate against Puyallup tribal members.

IV.

The Puyallup Tribe is a beneficiary of the Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1132, and its tribal members are entitled to treaty fishing rights at usual and accustomed areas, which include the Puyallup watershed. The treaty right to fish is in common with all the citizens of the territory and is not an exclusive right. The determination of the extent of this right within the boundary of the former Puyallup Indian reservation is not now before this court. The Treaty did provide that within these boundaries as originally described and established, these Indians were entitled to exclusive possession. However, this exclusive right of possession did not convey to these Indians ownership of all fish that entered the Puyallup River and were bound upstream to spawn, or were bound downstream to migrate.

Both parties intended that each would have a fair portion of the fish in the river. Neither party had the right to monopolize these fish nor damage the natural run in this river. Both parties intended that they would conduct

their own fishery so that the natural fish run would not be progressively depleted.

V.

The language "in common" in the Treaty of Medicine Creek means that no one has any individual rights greater than another's, a right in common belongs to no one man but belongs equally to more than one or to many indefinitely, as: life and sense are common to man and beast, or: the common privilege of citizens, the common wants of man. That is, a right in common belongs to the public; it has no separate owner.

VI.

The Indian treaty fishing rights do not extend to steelhead which are planted in the Puyallup River by the Department of Game under its hatchery program.

VII.

The state, through its Department of Game, or this Court has the authority to regulate the fishing activities of Puyallup tribal members when such regulations are necessary for the purposes of conservation.

VIII.

Conservation means the wise use of the resource and in the management of steelhead there must be necessary escapement for needed spawning to insure the perpetuation of the resource. The manner of fishing must be such that it can be controlled so that it does not impair or damage the necessary spawning escapement and further, the manner of fishing itself must not be destructive.

IX.

The fishing activities of the defendant tribe and its members, if allowed to proceed unrestrained, could result in the destruction or serious impairment of the steelhead fish runs in the Puyallup River. Once a run is destroyed it is generally impossible to reestablish. Such depletion would damage future treaty fishing rights of future Puyallup Indians.

X.

The treaty does not create or reserve for the Indians any property interest in the resource but does permit tribal members to have a fair portion of the natural adult steelhead entering the Puyallup River. A fair portion of the natural steelhead run is 45% of the

harvestable portion of the natural steelhead run in the Puyallup River in view of the number of Indian fishermen, the purpose of their fishery, the number of sports fishermen, the catch limitations, the locations of the fishing areas and the availability of harvestable fish.

XI.

The treaty does not authorize the Puyallup Indians to conduct their fishery in such a manner as to damage or destroy the fishery or to pre-empt completely others from fishing in common upriver even by fishing activities which occur within the boundaries of the reservation. This court has jurisdiction to exercise limitations upon the reservation Indian fishery to the extent that it is necessary to protect the passage of fish to upstream fishing and spawning areas.

XII.

The Puyallup tribal members by virtue of the treaty can utilize fishing gear which is prohibited to other citizens of the state for steelhead fishing, but the use of such gear is subject to the regulatory authority of the State of Washington through the Department of Game in the interest of conservation.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this 8 day of April, 1975.

/s/ W. L. Brown, Jr.
J U D G E

APPENDIX E

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT

OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AND FOR PIERCE COUNTY

DEPARTMENT OF GAME OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, vs. PUYALLUP TRIBE, INC., Defendant.	No. 158069 ORDER AND JUDGMENT

THIS MATTER came on regularly for trial commencing June 3, 1974, before the undersigned judge of the above-entitled court pursuant to an amended petition for declaratory relief pursuant to the remand of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington in accordance with the United States Supreme Court decision in this matter, 414 U.S. 44, and the state Supreme Court decision in 80 Wn. 2d 561, 497 P.2d 171. This action was previously considered by the Washington State Supreme Court in 70 Wn.2d 245, 422, P.2d 754, and by the

United States Supreme Court in 391 U.S. 392. The plaintiffs were represented by the Honorable Slade Gorton, Attorney General of the State of Washington, through Edward B. Mackie, Deputy Attorney General; the intervenor-plaintiff Northwest Steelheaders Council of Trout Unlimited and Gary Ellis, were represented by Don S. Willner and Vincent R. Larson; the intervenor-plaintiff Western Steelheaders, Inc. were represented by James Tannesen; the defendant Puyallup Tribe was represented by the Honorable Stan Pitkin, United States Attorney for the Western District of Washington, Thomas P. Giere, Assistant United States Attorney, George D. Dysart, Assistant Regional Solicitor, United States Department of Interior, and William H. Rodgers, Jr.; and Mr. John Sennhauser appeared for defendant Ramona Bennett, chairperson of the Puyallup Tribal Council; and the court having heard the evidence and arguments of counsel and being fully advised in the premises and having filed a memorandum opinion, and having entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law, now, therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:

That the findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in this case upon this date are incorporated herein by reference as though fully set forth and are

declared to govern the rights, status and other legal relationships between the parties.

That the Department of Game of the State of Washington has the authority to regulate the off-reservation fishing activities of the Puyallup tribal members when such regulations are necessary for the purposes of conservation.

That within the boundaries of the Puyallup Indian Reservation this Court has jurisdiction and authority to allocate fishery of both hatchery and naturally propogated steelhead between Treaty and Non-Treaty parties.

That duly enrolled members of the Puyallup Tribe are entitled to catch 45% of the harvestable natural steelhead run in the Puyallup River each year, but this catch cannot exceed 3,280 steelhead in any one year; that these Indians are authorized to fish with nets of their own choosing and to sell their steelhead catch commercially;

That these Indians have no Treaty right to fish for hatchery propogated [sic] steelhead planted by the State of Washington, Department of Game, in the Puyallup River. That in reference to these steelhead these Indians must fish in the

same manner as any other citizen of this state and must obey all state game regulations regarding the manner of fishing and the size of the catch. Provided these Indians need not be licensed by the State of Washington to fish for these steelhead.

That the defendant Puyallup Tribe shall file with the court within thirty days of this judgment of properly authenticated roll of Puyallup tribal members who are authorized to exercise treaty fishing rights in the Puyallup River watershed.

That the defendant Puyallup Tribe shall on a weekly basis during the steelhead fishing season report to the court and the plaintiff Department of Game the total number of steelhead caught by tribal members during that weekly period.

That the Department of Game of the State of Washington shall continue the planting of steelhead smolts in the Puyallup River.

That the court will retain continuing jurisdiction for the purposes of regulating, if necessary, the Indian fishery within the boundaries of the Puyallup Reservation and further for making such adjustments as appear appropriate in the

number of steelhead allocated for treaty fishermen.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this 8 day of April, 1975.

/s/ W. L. Brown, Jr.
J U D G E